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THE MAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY AND THEORIES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING 
Michael C. Dorf* 
Recent scholarship in political science and law challenges the view that judicial review in 
the United States poses what Alexander Bickel famously called the “counter-majoritarian 
difficulty.”  Although courts do regularly invalidate state and federal action on constitutional 
grounds, they rarely depart substantially from the median of public opinion.  When they do so 
depart, if public opinion does not eventually come in line with the judicial view, constitutional 
amendment, changes in judicial personnel, and/or changes in judicial doctrine typically bring 
judicial understandings closer to public opinion.  But if the modesty of courts dissolves Bickel’s 
worry, it raises a distinct one: Are courts that roughly follow public opinion capable of protecting 
minority rights against majoritarian excesses?  Do American courts, in other words, have a 
“majoritarian difficulty?”  This Article examines that question from an interpretive perspective.  It 
asks whether there is a normatively attractive account of the practice of judicial review that takes 
account of the Court’s inability to act in a strongly counter-majoritarian fashion.  After 
highlighting difficulties with three of the leading approaches to constitutional interpretation—
representation-reinforcement, originalism, and living constitutionalism—the Essay concludes that 
accounts of the Court as a kind of third legislative chamber fit best with its majoritarian bias.  
However, such third-legislative-chamber accounts rest on libertarian premises that lack universal 
appeal.  They also lack prescriptive force, although this may be a strength: Subordinating an 
interpretive theory—such as representation-reinforcement, originalism, or living 
constitutionalism—to a view of judicial review as a form of third-legislative-chamber veto can ease 
the otherwise unrealistic demands for counter-majoritarianism that interpretive theories face. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Recent scholarship in political science and law challenges the 
claim that judicial review in the United States poses what Alexander 
Bickel famously called the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.”1  Al-
though courts do regularly invalidate state and federal laws on consti-
tutional grounds, they rarely depart substantially from the median of 
public opinion.  As Barry Friedman shows in his magisterial history of 
the tug-of-war over constitutional meaning between the People and 
the Supreme Court, criticism of the Court for its supposedly counter-
majoritarian character has tended to track the substantive unpopular-
ity of the Court’s decisions.2  For a time, the Court can disregard such 
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 1 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (Vail-Ballou Press, Inc. 2nd ed. 
1986). 
 2 See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:  HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED 
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 274–77 (2009) 
(explaining how the increase in the crime rate in the mid-1960s turned public opinion 
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criticism, but if public opinion does not eventually come in line with 
the judicial view, constitutional amendment, changes in judicial per-
sonnel, and/or changes in judicial doctrine will typically bring judi-
cial understandings closer to public opinion.  Consequently, Ameri-
can courts have not, over the long run, acted as strongly counter-
majoritarian bodies.3  As Friedman observes in concluding his discus-
sion of the Court-packing controversy of the mid-1930s, which fol-
lowed the longest sustained period of counter-majoritarian decisions 
by the Supreme Court, “[f]or all of history’s frequent talk about the 
independence of the judiciary, that independence exists only at pub-
lic sufferance.”4 
The actual record of American judicial review thus mostly dis-
solves Bickel’s worry,5 but it raises a distinct one:  Are courts that 
 
against the Court’s criminal procedure decisions, especially Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966)). 
 3 See id. at 369 (predicting that over the long run, the Roberts Court will follow the pattern 
of its predecessors so that “its decisions will fall tolerably within the mainstream of public 
opinion, or the Court will be yanked back into line”).  For some years now, Michael 
Klarman has been making the point that most of the Supreme Court’s counter-
majoritarian “interventions can best be described as marginal.”  Michael J. Klarman, Re-
thinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 14 (1996).  Looking 
back upon the record of the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts, Klarman more re-
cently reached a conclusion very much in line with Friedman’s assessment of the entire 
history of judicial review.  The Court’s legitimacy, Klarman surmised, “flows less from the 
soundness of its legal reasoning than from its ability to predict future trends in public 
opinion.”  Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 
431, 488 (2005).  For further evidence and arguments in the same general direction, see 
DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY:  THE MISGUIDED 
QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 145 (2002), arguing that “[a]lthough the 
countermajoritarian difficulty has a core of truth, it has been blown out of proportion”; 
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:  The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 291 (1957), observing that it is “unrealistic to suppose that a Court 
whose members are recruited in the fashion of Supreme Court justices would long hold 
to norms of Right or Justice substantially at odds with the rest of the political elite”; Mark 
A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty:  Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. 
POL. DEV. 35 (1993), arguing that on the rare occasions when the Supreme Court does 
act in a strongly counter-majoritarian fashion, it fills a law-making void that in turn in-
itiates a dialogue); and Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881, 1889–90 (1991), noting that “[r]epeatedly, the unarticu-
lated normative orientations immanent in [the] background conceptions [of judges] 
shape and produce deeply majoritarian legal outcomes.” 
 4 FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 234. 
 5 In saying this, I recognize that there are objections to judicial review that rest on points of 
principle, regardless of the results to which it leads in particular cases.  See, e.g., Jeremy 
Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1346 (2006) (ar-
guing that “quite apart from the outcomes it generates, judicial review is democratically 
illegitimate”).  Even if, in the long run, courts reach roughly the same constitutional 
judgments as the People do, one might argue that the People are entitled to have their 
constitutional decisions respected simply in virtue of the fact that they made those deci-
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roughly follow public opinion capable of performing what is general-
ly understood as their core counter-majoritarian function—
protecting minority rights against majoritarian excesses?6  Do Ameri-
can courts, in other words, have a “majoritarian difficulty?”7  As 
Friedman astutely observes, the almost-obsessive focus on the sup-
posed counter-majoritarian difficulty has largely blinded critics to the 
real, and exactly opposite danger—that the Supreme Court is insuffi-
ciently counter-majoritarian to protect minority rights when they are 
really threatened.8 
This Article examines the implications of the substantial role that 
majority opinion plays in shaping judicial decision making from the 
perspective of constitutional interpretation.  I ask whether there is a 
normatively attractive account of the practice of judicial review that 
takes account of the Court’s inability to act in a strongly counter-
majoritarian fashion.  The Article shows how three leading normative 
approaches to constitutional interpretation—representation-
reinforcement, originalism, and living constitutionalism—all assume 
a capacity for counter-majoritarianism that may exceed the abilities of 
 
sions.  In this view, to defend judicial review on the ground that its results coincide with 
popular opinion is a little like defending the outcome of a procedurally flawed criminal 
trial on the ground that the defendant was, after all, guilty; if there is a procedural right—
to democratic participation or a fair trial—then the outcome is largely beside the point.  
Cf. id. at 1372–73 (distinguishing outcome-related arguments for and against judicial re-
view from process-based arguments).  However, in this Article, I am not interested in de-
fending judicial review based on the majoritarian pattern of its results.  Consequently, I 
shall simply set aside Waldron’s objection in principle. 
 6 See, e.g., Aharon Barak, Foreword:  A Judge on Judging:  The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democ-
racy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 19–21 (2002) (contending “that human rights are the core of 
substantive democracy” and justifying judicial review on the ground that “protection of 
human rights—the rights of every individual and every minority group—cannot be left 
only in the hands of the legislature and the executive, which, by their nature, reflect ma-
jority opinion”). 
 7 I cannot claim originality for the term “majoritarian difficulty.”  For uses of the phrase to 
mean roughly what I use it to mean, see Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty:  Elec-
tive Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995), questioning whether 
elected judges have sufficient independence to police political actors, and Darren Lenard 
Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty:  Affirmative Action, Sodomy, and Supreme Court Poli-
tics, 23 L. & INEQUALITY. 1 (2005), using Supreme Court cases involving affirmative action 
and same-sex sodomy to illustrate the proposition that judicial doctrine mostly follows, ra-
ther than shapes, public opinion.  For a somewhat different use, see Randy E. Barnett, 
Kurt Lash’s Majoritarian Difficulty:  A Response to A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth 
Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. 937 (2008), arguing that the Ninth Amendment should be 
given an individual rather than collective interpretation, and that the latter suffers from a 
“majoritarian difficulty.” 
 8 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 370–74 (discussing, inter alia, the Court’s shameful acquies-
cence in the detention of Japanese-Americans, and their exclusion from the West Coast, 
during World War II). 
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real courts.  By contrast, accounts of the Supreme Court as a kind of 
third legislative chamber fit better with its majoritarian bias.9 
Even if only occasionally exercised, the judicial “veto” of legisla-
tion improves the overall mix of under-enforcement and over-
enforcement of constitutional rights.  That is a modestly counter-
majoritarian criterion, and thus one that courts can satisfy. 
Third-legislative-chamber accounts have their own problems, 
however.  Most importantly, they rest on a controversially libertarian 
normative view that sees government action as generally more dan-
gerous than government inaction.  Further, third-legislative-chamber 
views do not prescribe any particular interpretive methodology.  They 
thus require supplementation by some other account, such as repre-
sentation-reinforcement, originalism, or living constitutionalism.  
One might think that using one of these interpretive methods as in-
terpretive “filler” in a generally third-legislative-chamber view of judi-
cial review simply re-raises the objection that these accounts are in-
consistent with the majoritarian difficulty.  However, it is possible that 
“encasing” such substantive theories in a third-legislative-chamber ac-
count reduces the demands for counter-majoritarianism, and thus 
saves them from their unrealistic ambition. 
II.  INTERPRETATION AND MAJORITARIANISM 
Let us call the notion that the Supreme Court is at most weakly 
counter-majoritarian the “Friedman thesis.”  Friedman and others 
have compiled voluminous evidence for this thesis.10  Rather than re-
hearse that evidence, here I shall simply provide two categories of il-
lustrations from the case law that are well known to anyone who is 
even passingly familiar with constitutional law. 
First, consider the tendency of the Supreme Court to provide only 
weak resistance to movements to infringe civil rights and civil liberties 
in times of war.  The Sedition Act, President Lincoln’s suspension of 
habeas corpus, the Red Scare of the World War I era, the internment 
of Japanese Americans during World War II, and McCarthyism are 
simply the highlights of public crackdowns when national security was 
 
 9 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV. 
L. REV. 1693, 1694 (2008) (arguing that “the . . . ground that legislatures and courts 
should both be enlisted to protect fundamental rights and, accordingly, that both should 
have veto powers over legislation that might reasonably be thought to violate such rights” 
underlies “[t]he best case for judicial review”). 
 10 See sources cited supra notes 2–3. 
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perceived as threatened.  Yet as Geoffrey Stone has shown,11 and as 
cases like Abrams v. United States12 and Korematsu v. United States13 re-
veal, when push comes to shove, Supreme Court Justices have hardly 
been immune to what Judge Learned Hand called the “herd in-
stinct.”14 
Perhaps it is too much to expect courts to stand up for civil liber-
ties and civil rights when the country perceives an existential threat—
although one might as readily argue that such times of perceived cri-
sis are exactly when courts are most needed.  In any event, we also see 
strong evidence for the Friedman thesis in matters of civil rights even 
under ordinary circumstances.  Consider the historical development 
of equal protection doctrine. 
The Supreme Court granted recognition to equality claims based 
on race before it recognized claims against sex discrimination, which, 
in turn, were recognized before claims against sexual orientation dis-
crimination were recognized.  (The last of these categories is still not 
deemed “suspect” under the official doctrine.)  Why?  Because that 
was the order in which the larger society came to accept the claims of, 
respectively, the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, and 
the gay rights movement.  “Before an argument or emotional appeal 
succeeds in changing the minds of lawmakers (including judges), it 
must first change the minds of a mass of the public.”15 
Conversely—and problematically for present purposes—judges 
are highly unlikely to stand up for the civil rights of truly margina-
lized groups.  They may get a little bit out ahead of public opinion, as 
has arguably happened now with respect to same-sex marriage, but 
only a little. Furthermore, as we saw in California in 2008, even a rela-
tively small judicial move out ahead of public attitudes—as in the dis-
tance from same-sex civil unions to same-sex marriage—is susceptible 
to being snapped back by public opinion.16 
 
 11 See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES:  FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME (2004) (describing 
majority support for, and judicial acquiescence to, limitations on freedom of speech dur-
ing wartime). 
 12 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (holding that the Sedition Act of 1918, which restricted anti-
American speech, does not violate the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution). 
 13 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that Executive Order 9066, authorizing the use of intern-
ment camps for Americans of Japanese descent, does not violate the U.S. Constitution). 
 14 Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine:  Some 
Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 749–50 (1975) (quoting Letter from Learned 
Hand to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (Jan. 2, 1921)). 
 15 Michael C. Dorf, The Paths to Legal Equality:  A Reply to Dean Sullivan, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 791, 
807 (2002). 
 16 See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 59 (Cal. 2009) (describing Proposition 8 in the course 
of upholding the constitutional amendment that passed in 2008 to limit “marriage” to un-
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Thus, we have the majoritarian difficulty.  In all cases, and espe-
cially in cases involving the most vulnerable civil liberties and civil 
rights claims, courts appear to be ill-equipped to play their most basic 
constitutional function.  The next three Parts of this Article show how 
the leading approaches to constitutional interpretation nonetheless 
assume a substantial counter-majoritarian capacity on the part of 
courts. 
III.  REPRESENTATION-REINFORCEMENT 
As set forth most clearly and forcefully in the work of John Hart 
Ely and footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case,17 counter-
majoritarianism can be a vice and a virtue of judicial review.  With 
Bickel, Ely was prepared to recognize that judicial review substitutes 
the constitutional views of unelected judges for those of elected offi-
cials and that, absent some special justification, the practice is unde-
mocratic.18  For Ely, the special justification was representation rein-
forcement:  Where the mechanisms of democracy themselves have 
failed, courts can find a warrant in the Constitution for intervening. 
To give credit where credit is due, Ely’s theory elegantly explained 
and justified one category of important cases:19  The reapportionment 
rulings in Baker v. Carr20 and Reynolds v. Sims.21  In finding apportion-
ment challenges justiciable and then insisting on a principle of one-
 
ions between “a man and a woman”).  Such public control over judicial rulings is easier 
under a state constitution like California’s, which can be amended by a majority vote in a 
referendum, than under the Federal Constitution.  Nonetheless, as Friedman and others 
have shown, we find the same phenomenon at the federal level. 
 17 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail 
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minori-
ties, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). 
 18 See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 16–17 (“[W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional 
a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives 
of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevail-
ing majority, but against it.”); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 62 (1980) (“[P]art of the point of the Constitution is to check today’s 
majority.”). 
 19 In criticizing Ely’s theory, as I do in the balance of this Part, I do not back away from my 
earlier evaluation.  I continue to regard Democracy and Distrust as “the single most percep-
tive justificatory account of the work of the Warren Court and arguably of modern consti-
tutional law more broadly.”  Michael C. Dorf, The Coherentism of Democracy and Distrust, 
114 YALE L.J. 1237, 1238 (2005). 
 20 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (rejecting the characterization of reapportionment issues as purely 
political questions). 
 21 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that state legislative districts must be apportioned to 
represent approximately equal numbers of people). 
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person-one-vote, the Court stood up to the political process as it was 
then configured.  But the apportionment cases were unusual because 
they involved a highly non-majoritarian elective system that was made 
more majoritarian by judicial intervention.  Once the Court inter-
vened, a new political reality appeared, and the officials elected un-
der one-person-one-vote had a strong interest in supporting the re-
gime the Court had created. 
By contrast, other Warren Court interventions endorsed by Ely—
especially the rights revolution in criminal procedure22 and protec-
tion for racial minorities23—fall more clearly into those areas in which 
the image of heroic counter-majoritarian Court was destined to suc-
cumb to the Friedman thesis. 
The rollback of Warren Court criminal procedure protections 
under the ensuing Burger and Rehnquist Courts may not have been a 
full and open counter-revolution, but it was real enough nonetheless.  
As Carol Steiker observed, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts left the 
Warren Court’s edifice of criminal procedure jurisprudence intact 
but hollowed it out by eliminating remedies.24 
We can discern a similar pattern in the Court’s equality jurispru-
dence.  Even as the status of Brown v. Board of Education25 has become 
ever-more iconic, its meaning has been transformed into a principle 
of color-blindness that is now most commonly used to protect the sta-
tus quo against race-conscious efforts to aid racial minorities.26  Thus, 
in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,27 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a 5-4 Court, treated a city’s race-
conscious efforts to increase the level of integration of its public 
schools as themselves in conflict with the core of Brown.  One need 
not necessarily disagree with the Roberts opinion (although I do dis-
agree with it rather strongly) to see it as no less a culmination of Ri-
 
 22 See ELY, supra note 18, at 73–75, 96–97. 
 23 See id. at 135–79. 
 24 See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure?  Two Audiences, 
Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2470 (1996) (“[T]he Burger and Rehnquist Courts 
have accepted to a significant extent the Warren Court’s definitions of constitutional 
‘rights’ while waging counter-revolutionary war against the Warren Court’s constitutional 
‘remedies’ of evidentiary exclusion and its federal review and reversal of convictions.”). 
 25 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (finding racially segregated public schools to be unconstitutional 
because they are “inherently unequal”). 
 26 See Cheryl I. Harris, The Story of Plessy v. Ferguson:  The Death and Resurrection of Racial For-
malism, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 187, 189–91 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009) 
(describing the modern principle of color-blindness as a descendant of the nineteenth-
century formalism that sustained segregation). 
 27 551 U.S. 701, 708–11, 747–48 (2007). 
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chard Nixon’s “Southern Strategy” than the application of Herbert 
Wechsler’s neutral principles of constitutional law.28 
By contrast with the Roberts Court, Ely himself thought that race-
conscious government programs aimed at overcoming racial hie-
rarchy ought to be judged by a more forgiving standard than discrim-
ination against members of racial minority groups,29 but race-based 
affirmative action has proven highly unpopular.30  Here, we see the 
Friedman thesis undermining the counter-majoritarian—i.e., minori-
ty-protecting—role that courts are assigned under Ely’s theory of re-
presentation-reinforcement.  A Court subject to majoritarian influ-
ence transformed a principle initially understood as affording 
protection to “discrete and insular minorities”31 into a constitutional 
rule whose primary role appears to be to limit the occasional efforts 
of majoritarian politics to constrain itself in favor of minority inter-
ests. 
The evidence is starkest at the national level.  Richard Primus 
notes that since the Justices first held in Bolling v. Sharpe32 that, under 
a doctrine sometimes called “reverse incorporation,” the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies principles of equal protec-
tion to the federal government, 
the Supreme Court has never declared a federal statute or regulation un-
constitutional on the grounds that it discriminates against members of a 
racial minority group.  Nor has the Court ever invalidated any other kind 
of federal action on those grounds.  The Court has never found that a 
federal prosecutor impermissibly struck a juror from a venire on account 
of race, that a federal law enforcement officer engaged in unconstitu-
tional racial discrimination against criminal suspects, or that a federal 
employer fired an employee for unconstitutional racial reasons.  This 
does not mean that reverse incorporation has had no progeny at all.  In 
 
 28 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1959). 
 29 See ELY, supra note 18, at 170–72 (noting that when a majority discriminates against itself 
in order to benefit minority groups, fewer constitutional suspicions arise). 
 30 See Press Release, Quinnipiac Univ. Polling Inst., U.S. Voters Disagree 3-1 with Sotomayor 
on Key Case, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; Most Say Abolish Affirmative Ac-
tion (June 3, 2009), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/images/polling/us/us06032009.doc 
(indicating that a significant majority of U.S. voters oppose affirmative action).  Opinions 
reported to pollsters translate into votes.  Even voters in the relatively liberal states of Cal-
ifornia, Michigan, and Washington voted to ban affirmative action when given the 
chance.  See Tamar Lewin, Colleges Regroup After Voters Ban Race Preferences, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
26, 2007, at A1 (noting that California, Florida, Michigan, and Washington “forbid racial 
preferences”). 
 31 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
 32 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (applying the same equality principle to public schools segre-
gated on the basis of race at the federal and state level). 
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an important development [sic] decades after 1954, the courts have in-
voked Bolling to limit the use of affirmative action.33 
To be clear, I am not now interested in whether equal protection, 
properly understood, requires color-blindness, anti-subordination, or 
any other approach.34  The point is that the Supreme Court’s adop-
tion of the rhetoric and much of the reality of color-blindness was a 
predictable consequence of the Friedman thesis, in light of the un-
popularity of affirmative action.  Despite its broad influence on the 
shape of constitutional law, Ely’s advice to courts—act in a counter-
majoritarian fashion to protect the long-term systemic losers in the 
political process—has proven nearly impossible for the Court to fol-
low.  And that is exactly what an attentive student of the Friedman 
thesis would have predicted. 
IV.  ORIGINALISM 
Originalism also succumbs to the Friedman thesis because origi-
nalism, like Ely’s representation-reinforcement theory, aims to justify 
counter-majoritarian judicial decisions, albeit somewhat different 
ones.  Indeed, on principle, originalism would appear to be even 
harder to follow than just about any non-originalist competitor be-
cause of the utterly reactionary counsel of originalism.35 
 
 33 Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 978 (2004).  No Supreme 
Court decision since 2004 falsifies Primus’s observation. 
 34 For what it is worth, I believe that not much turns on the general interpretive principle 
selected to give effect to the concept of equal protection.  See generally Michael C. Dorf, A 
Partial Defense of an Anti-Discrimination Principle, ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (2002), 
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=ils (arguing that 
some criticisms of the “anti-discrimination” principle are misguided). 
 35 I use the term “originalism” here to refer to theories of interpretation that place disposi-
tive weight on the relatively concrete understandings and practices of the Framers’ gen-
eration.  My use of the term may thus exclude “new” originalists who would define the 
original public meaning of constitutional text at a sufficiently high level of generality to 
overcome the concrete, expected applications of the framing generation.  See RANDY E. 
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 118–30 
(2004) (distinguishing interpretation from construction); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal 
Theory Lexicon:  Interpretation and Construction, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Feb. 8, 2009), 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2009/02/legal-theory-lexicon-interpretation-
and-construction.html (explaining the difference between interpretation and construc-
tion, and demonstrating the purpose of distinguishing the two); cf. Jack M. Balkin, Abor-
tion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 291–311 (2007) (attempting to re-
concile originalism and living constitutionalism by contending that the Constitution’s 
original meaning is not its “original expected application” because its adopters “sought to 
embody general and abstract principles . . . to be fleshed out later on by later genera-
tions”).  My point is not that such theorists are not “really” originalists, whatever that 
might mean.  However, an originalist who avers that interpretation runs out before most 
or all of the hard work of constitutional “construction” begins, see, e.g., KEITH E. 
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Theories of interpretation rooted in contemporary values (includ-
ing representation-reinforcement) offer the courts one side in a con-
temporary debate:  pro-choice or pro-life on abortion; separationism 
versus neutrality on religion; permitting or invalidating the death pe-
nalty; and so forth.  Where a constitutional theory offers a consistent-
ly minority position—as Ely’s theory does with respect to affirmative 
action—we can expect that, over the long run, its counsel will be dis-
regarded by a Court subject to majoritarian influences.  But in choos-
ing a side in a contemporary debate, a non-originalist theory at least 
has a chance of choosing the winning or close-to-winning side, so that 
majority opinion does not coalesce against that position. 
By contrast, originalism—if honestly applied, an important caveat 
to which we shall return in a moment—offers positions that have 
been thoroughly rejected.  Suppose an originalist Supreme Court Jus-
tice thinks the best evidence of the original understanding is incon-
sistent with the laws establishing paper money not backed by specie, 
as a majority of the Court thought in 1870.36  A majority opinion so 
holding would be simply unthinkable, because “in our age of checks, 
credit cards and electronic banking, the issue is off the agenda:  no 
Supreme Court would now reexamine the merits, no matter how 
closely wedded it was to original intent theory.”37 
Likewise, suppose an originalist Justice thought that the federal 
administrative state clearly violated the original understanding of fe-
deralism and/or separation of powers.38  Or suppose an originalist 
concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment was not originally un-
derstood to restrict state laws and policies that discriminate on the 
basis of sex.  In none of these areas would an opinion substituting 
doctrines based on the original understanding for more publicly ac-
ceptable current doctrines long survive.  How do I know?  Consider 
 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION:  DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
MEANING 2, 4–5 (1999), must supplement his originalist theory of interpretation with 
some other theory to produce normative guidance for adjudication.  Because I am inter-
ested in actual judicial outputs, a largely empty version of originalism is not especially re-
levant to my purposes here. 
 36 See Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 623 (1869) (looking to the intentions of 
“those who framed and those who adopted the Constitution”), overruled by Knox v. Lee, 79 
U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).  Although invoking the original understanding, most of the 
majority opinion in Hepburn v. Griswold might be better characterized as a form of doc-
trinal or structural interpretation. 
 37 Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 
744 (1988). 
 38 See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 
& n.1 (1994) (arguing that “[t]he post-New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional;” 
that is, “at variance with the Constitution’s original public meaning”). 
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that despite the Supreme Court’s distinct rightward turn over the last 
three decades, only one Justice, Clarence Thomas, consistently avows 
originalist positions,39 and we might wonder whether he does so only 
because he has the luxury of knowing that his one vote will not make 
law. 
More broadly, on a great many issues the gap between originalist 
positions and the contemporary spectrum of acceptable views is simp-
ly too wide to survive the Friedman thesis.  A Supreme Court that ab-
olished paper money, invalidated the alphabet soup of federal regula-
tory agencies, or declared women ineligible to be lawyers,40 simply 
would not last.  As a prescriptive account of constitutional interpreta-
tion, originalism is a non-starter.  Not infrequently, it asks judges to 
take strongly counter-majoritarian views, not in the service of current-
ly controversial positions, but in the service of positions that have for 
decades or even centuries been relegated to the margins of public 
opinion. 
To be sure, one might argue that, as supplemented by stare deci-
sis, originalism is not so nearly counter-majoritarian.  In this view, the 
original understanding only plays a substantial role in constitutional 
adjudication with respect to questions of first impression.  However, it 
is not at all clear why the sorts of prudential concerns that underlie 
the doctrine of stare decisis should be permitted to displace the orig-
inal understanding when employed indirectly, but such concerns are 
deemed illegitimate when invoked directly as grounds for non-
originalist decision making.41  For such reasons, some originalists 
 
 39 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 58 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he term 
‘commerce’ [was] consistently used [in founding-era documents] to mean trade or ex-
change—not all economic or gainful activity that has some attenuated connection to 
trade or exchange.”); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he very notion of a ‘substantial effects’ test under the Commerce 
Clause is inconsistent with the original understanding of Congress’ powers . . . .”); United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[O]ur case law has 
drifted far from the original understanding of the Commerce Clause.”). 
 40 That last example is, I admit, somewhat unrealistic.  See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.) 130, 139 (1872) (upholding a state bar decision excluding a female applicant 
based on sex—a decision that has been effectively repudiated by modern equal protec-
tion decisions).  But see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996) (invalidating 
Virginia Military Institute policy of denying women admission on account of their sex); 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 208–10 (1976) (striking down a state law granting women 
access to alcohol at a younger age than men); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690–
91 (1973) (holding that women may be required to prove their husbands’ dependency to 
receive additional benefits when men do not have to prove the same for their wives).  In 
order for the Supreme Court to reinstate Bradwell, a state would first have to adopt such a 
blatantly discriminatory policy, which is highly unlikely. 
 41 See Monaghan, supra note 37, at 772 (“[I]f the Court legitimately may prevent inquiry into 
original understanding in order to maintain transformative change, does this concession 
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think that non-originalist precedents are not entitled to much, if any, 
weight.42 
None of this is to say that originalism lacks a certain rhetorical 
force.  The Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller43 
powerfully illustrates how the language of original meaning can be 
invoked to obscure the role that politics and public opinion play be-
hind the scenes.  We can cheerfully grant that every Justice who voted 
to find an individual right to possess a handgun for home defense 
thought this result was compelled in some way by the original under-
standing of the Second Amendment.  But that takes nothing away 
from the sort of legal realist analysis that could readily show how 
views of the eighteenth century changed in response to a political 
campaign in the late twentieth century.44  Whether the Court’s hold-
ing in Heller will stick depends not on its correctness as a matter of 
original understanding, but on whether a critical mass of the Ameri-
can people, over the long run, continue to value a right to armed self-
defense. 
The best that can be said for originalism as a viable theory of con-
stitutional interpretation is that it may be sufficiently indeterminate 
to permit its practitioners to reach results in harmony with the main-
stream of public opinion.  That, however, is nearly the exact opposite 
of the sort of claim typically made by originalism’s champions.45 
V.  LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM 
On its face, living constitutionalism—a capacious term that I shall 
use to refer to a family of non-originalist theories that task judges with 
incorporating current values and attitudes in their understanding of 
 
also license prospective disregard of original understanding when the Court is satisfied 
that change is necessary to maintain systemic equilibrium?”). 
 42 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 155–60 (1990) (advocating a narrow role for precedent in constitutional adjudica-
tion); Edwin Meese III, U.S. Attorney Gen., Construing the Constitution, Address Before 
the Washington, D.C. Federalist Society Lawyers’ Division (Nov. 15, 1985), in 19 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 22, 26–28 (1985) (contending that the overruling of precedent merely cor-
rects past judicial mistakes). 
 43 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual 
right to possess firearms for, among other things, self-defense). 
 44 See Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 309, 
315–21 (1998) (“This is not the result of mere chance; it is part of a concerted campaign 
to persuade the courts to reconsider the Second Amendment . . . .”). 
 45 See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 288–305 
(2009) (noting how the evolution of originalism and the wide disagreement among con-
temporary originalists undercut originalists’ claim to determinacy). 
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the Constitution46—should be able to accommodate the Friedman 
thesis.  Indeed, we might even reformulate the Friedman thesis to 
state that the Supreme Court will inevitably engage in living constitu-
tionalism, even when it denies doing so. 
Living constitutionalism runs into trouble when we attempt to jus-
tify it.  Originalists (and others) will be heard to object that there is 
no need for courts to engage in judicial review if their goal is to keep 
the Constitution in tune with the times.  Any reasonably fair majorita-
rian process will lead to results that reflect the views of contemporary 
majorities. 
To be sure, we can give a partial response on behalf of living con-
stitutionalism.  Where the baseline understanding of the Constitution 
forbids some newly popular policy, living constitutionalism can be in-
voked as a reason for the Court to permit that policy.  This is the dy-
namic that President Franklin D. Roosevelt had in mind when he crit-
icized the New Deal Court’s “horse-and-buggy interpretation of the 
Constitution.”47  However, one does not need living constitutionalism 
as such to permit newfangled arrangements; one only needs an ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation that permits substantial room 
for democratic experimentation.  The leading theories of constitu-
tional interpretation—whether of the representation-reinforcing, 
originalist, or living variety—exist for the purpose of justifying judi-
cial review, not for justifying the failure to exercise the power of judi-
cial review in any given circumstance. 
And indeed, in practice, living constitutionalism justifies counter-
majoritarian judicial review.  The Supreme Court’s death penalty ju-
risprudence is instructive because it illustrates the substantial ambi-
tion and limited reach of living constitutionalism. 
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, a majority of the Court invalidated 
the death penalty as it was then practiced in nearly every state.48  Jus-
 
 46 Indeed, we might define living constitutionalism as simply “the polar opposite” of strong 
originalism.  See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 11 (2010).  In saying that 
living constitutionalism incorporates contemporary values and attitudes into the judicial 
“understanding” of the Constitution, I do not mean to be taking a position on the recent 
debate over how much of constitutional law is “interpretation” versus “construction.”  See 
Solum, supra note 35 (using “interpretation” to refer to the “activity of determining the 
linguistic meaning (or semantic content) of a legal text,” while using “construction” to re-
fer to the “activity of translating the semantic content of a legal text into legal rules”). 
 47 FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 216 (stating that “by 1937 there was a pervasive sentiment that 
the real problem lay not with the Constitution but with the justices—‘nine old men’ who 
could not understand that times had changed”). 
 48 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (holding that the death penalty is in 
some instances cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments). 
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tice Douglas’s concurring opinion expressly spoke the language of liv-
ing constitutionalism, invoking “the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”49  Nor was this lan-
guage mere cover.  There was good evidence that American public 
opinion was turning away from the death penalty.50  It just happened 
that the majority in Furman misread that evidence.  In response to the 
Court’s decision, states re-wrote their death penalty statutes, and the 
Court soon acquiesced.51 
So far, our story looks like it puts living constitutionalism in har-
mony with the Friedman thesis.  But if we probe a bit deeper we see 
that the Justices who acceded to public opinion—Stewart and 
White52—were not in any way committed to living constitutionalism.  
Neither Justice Stewart nor Justice White ever strongly endorsed any 
particular interpretive methodology (although as dissenters in, re-
spectively, Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade, though not vice-
versa, each occasionally sounded judicial restraint themes).53  By con-
trast, the two Justices most closely associated with living constitutio-
nalism—Justices Brennan and Marshall—dissented from the Court’s 
acceptance of the death penalty in Gregg.54  Thereafter, they consis-
 
 49 Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
 50 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 286–87 (“There was a flood of evidence that public senti-
ments were tipping against capital punishment.”). 
 51 See id. at 288 (observing how the Furman Court’s 5-4 vote finding the death penalty un-
constitutional gave way to a decision upholding the death penalty); see also Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t is now evident that a large propor-
tion of American society continues to regard [capital punishment] as an appropriate and 
necessary criminal sanction.”). 
 52 Justices Stewart and White voted with the majority in Furman to strike down the applica-
tion of the death penalty at issue in that case, but they appeared to change course by vot-
ing with the majority to uphold the use of the death penalty at issue in Gregg.  See Gregg, 
428 U.S. at 206–07 (plurality opinion) (Stewart, J.) (White, J., concurring); Furman, 408 
U.S. at 306–14 (Stewart, J., concurring) (White, J., concurring). 
 53 See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (stating, in a compa-
nion case to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), that “[the abortion] issue, for the most 
part, should be left with the people and to the political processes”); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 530–31 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“It is the essence of judicial du-
ty to subordinate our own personal views, our own ideas of what legislation is wise and 
what is not.”). 
 54 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 230–31 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The calculated killing of a human 
being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed person’s humani-
ty.” (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 290) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 231 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The death penalty . . . is a cruel and unusual punishment pro-
hibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
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tently dissented from every Supreme Court decision upholding a 
death sentence.55 
Thus, the Brennan/Marshall version of living constitutionalism—
like the variants of it one finds in academic writings—eschewed poll-
driven decisions.  They and other living constitutionalists could give 
an answer to the originalists and other critics who charge that living 
constitutionalism is unnecessary because it simply replicates the 
judgments of majoritarian processes.  No, it does not, Brennan and 
Marshall emphatically declared.  Justice Brennan’s dissent in Gregg 
spoke of the (im)morality of the death penalty, without any serious 
effort to connect his moral judgments to those of the People.56  Jus-
tice Marshall made the effort, but in Furman and Gregg he articulated 
what might be called a “false consciousness” account of public opi-
nion.57  Marshall averred that “the American people are largely una-
ware of the information critical to a judgment on the morality of the 
death penalty,” and concluded that “if they were better informed they 
would consider it shocking, unjust, and unacceptable.”58 
Whether Justice Marshall was right or wrong about that predic-
tion, it should be clear that this version of living constitutionalism es-
capes the criticism that it simply replicates majoritarianism within the 
judiciary.  Instead, Marshall’s version of living constitutionalism, like 
Brennan’s, aspires to be substantially counter-majoritarian.  The 
judge who practices living constitutionalism does not simply look to 
public opinion for the contemporary meaning of constitutional pro-
visions.  Instead, he filters raw public opinion by asking how it would 
change if it were fully informed. 
Although Ronald Dworkin has not championed living constitutio-
nalism per se, the coherentism of his view of law as integrity is fairly 
characteristic of how judges committed to living constitutionalism 
 
 55 See MICHAEL MELLO, AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY:  THE RELENTLESS DISSENTS OF 
JUSTICES BRENNAN AND MARSHALL 4 (1996) (discussing “Brennan’s and Marshall’s relent-
less dissents in capital cases,” including dissents from denials of certiorari “in more than 
twenty-five hundred [capital] cases between 1976 and 1991”). 
 56 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 229 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he State, even as it punishes, must 
treat its citizens in a manner consistent with their intrinsic worth as human beings . . . .”). 
 57 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he American people know little 
about the death penalty, and . . . the opinions of an informed public would differ signifi-
cantly from those of a public unaware of the consequences and effects of the death penal-
ty.”); Furman, 408 U.S. at 360–69 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[W]hether or not a pu-
nishment is cruel and unusual depends, not on whether its mere mention ‘shocks the 
conscience and sense of justice of the people,’ but on whether people who were fully in-
formed as to the purposes of the penalty and its liabilities would find the penalty shock-
ing, unjust, and unacceptable.”). 
 58 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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produce counter-majoritarian results.  We may envision raw public 
opinion as the pre-interpretive intuitions of the public at large.59  The 
coherentist judge brings these pre-interpretive intuitions, along with 
any relevant legal materials, such as constitutional provisions and 
precedents, into reflective equilibrium.  And because in Dworkin’s 
version, as in other versions of this approach, the glue that makes the 
data points cohere in one place rather than another consists of  
“principles of political morality”60 that are often contestable, the 
judge will sometimes find that the Constitution requires broadly un-
popular results.  Living constitutionalism, as preached and practiced 
by those most committed to it, is substantially counter-majoritarian.61  
Hence, living constitutionalists have an answer to the objection that 
there is no justification for using the courts, rather than the elective 
branches, to channel public opinion; living constitutionalism, they 
can say, does not simply channel public opinion. 
However, that conclusion leaves living constitutionalism vulnera-
ble to the Friedman thesis.  Like representation-reinforcement and 
originalism, living constitutionalism places counter-majoritarian de-
mands on judges that are too difficult for them to meet.  Here, the 
death penalty jurisprudence is telling.  Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, who both would have struck down the death penalty as invaria-
bly cruel and unusual in Furman, adhered to that view throughout 
their careers, but they only ever were joined by “deathbed converts.”  
After his retirement, Justice Powell came to the conclusion that the 
death penalty was unconstitutional.62  Only months before his own re-
tirement, Justice Blackmun announced that he had reached the same 
conclusion and would “no longer . . . tinker with the machinery of 
death.”63  Less than two years before announcing his retirement from 
the Court,64 Justice Stevens revealed that he too had concluded that 
the death penalty was categorically unconstitutional (nevertheless he 
 
 59 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45–49 (1986) (discussing pre-interpretive views of a 
community). 
 60 RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 36 (1985). 
 61 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 343 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“It is the 
particular role of courts to hear [death-sentenced prisoners’] voices, for the Constitution 
declares that the majoritarian chorus may not alone dictate the conditions of social 
life.”). 
 62 In his biography of Justice Powell, John Jeffries reports a conversation in which Powell 
stated that, were he still on the Court, he would vote to reject the death penalty in all cas-
es.  See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.:  A BIOGRAPHY 451 (2001). 
 63 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (denying certi-
orari). 
 64 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Charlie Savage, Justice Stevens Retiring, Giving Obama a 2nd Pick, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2010, at A1. 
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declared himself bound to continue to apply precedents upholding 
the death penalty so long as they were not overruled).65 
Although Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens each explained 
their respective conclusions regarding the death penalty in somewhat 
different terms, their conversions were remarkably similar in all com-
ing too late to change the course of the Court.  Speaking only for 
themselves either after the fact or in parting shots, these Justices 
could invoke a living Constitution that substantially diverged from 
the views of the public more broadly.  In each case, however, the 
Court they left behind, whether invoking living constitutionalism or 
some other theory, found itself accepting the death penalty, even as it 
was troubled by marginal cases such as the execution of mentally re-
tarded and juvenile defendants.66  Even though the Court continues 
to assert that its “own judgment will be brought to bear on the ques-
tion of the of the death penalty’s acceptability under the Eighth 
Amendment,”67 that judgment ends up looking a great deal like the 
judgment of the American people as a whole. 
When it comes to state infliction of death, living constitutionalism 
proves unable in practice to garner the votes to implement its coun-
ter-majoritarian program.  Nor is there any reason to think that the 
death penalty is an area in which the pull of public opinion on the 
Justices would be especially strong.  If anything, the view that “death 
is different”68 would suggest that capital punishment cases comprise 
an area in which the Court should be inclined to act in a strongly 
counter-majoritarian fashion.  Yet it has not been able to do so. 
VI.  THIRD-LEGISLATIVE-CHAMBER THEORIES 
The three immediately foregoing Parts of this Article have shown 
that three leading approaches to constitutional interpretation—
representation-reinforcement, originalism, and living constitutional-
ism—all assume a greater judicial capacity for counter-majoritarian 
decision making than the historical record supports.  That is no acci-
dent.  These methodologies rest on theories specifically designed to 
justify some measure of counter-majoritarianism. 
 
 65 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 86–87 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 66 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding the death penalty unconstitu-
tional for “offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed”); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding the death penalty unconstitutional 
for the mentally disabled). 
 67 Roper, 543 U.S. at 563 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opi-
nion)). 
 68 See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986). 
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It is thus tempting to generalize and say that every theory of con-
stitutional interpretation designed to justify counter-majoritarianism 
will end up placing demands on the judiciary that it is unable to 
meet.  Yet surprisingly, that generalization may be false.  At least one 
family of theories—what I shall call “third-legislative-chamber” theo-
ries—seeks to justify counter-majoritarianism but does not necessarily 
demand of courts results that they cannot produce. 
What is a third-legislative-chamber account of judicial review?  Just 
as the Senate and the House of Lords provide the opportunity for re-
consideration of proposed legislation by a body of legislators with a 
somewhat different perspective and constituency from the Houses of 
Representatives and Commons, respectively, the Supreme Court pro-
vides yet a third look at the laws, or so the argument goes.  The third-
legislative-chamber notion is only a metaphor, of course, because the 
U.S. Supreme Court does not act on legislation until after it is 
adopted, and frequently invalidates legislation as applied, rather than 
killing an entire bill.69  Moreover, given the Court’s role in reviewing 
state legislation, it is a mistake to think of it as a part of the distinc-
tively federal lawmaking process.  Nonetheless, the core idea of third-
legislative-chamber accounts of judicial review is clear enough.  And 
if one finds third-legislative-chamber theories attractive, then one 
may think that they solve the majoritarian difficulty. 
Rather than provide a comprehensive catalogue of third-
legislative-chamber accounts of judicial review, I shall take one very 
ably presented version to stand in for the family as a whole.70  In re-
sponse to Jeremy Waldron’s critique of judicial review,71 Richard Fal-
lon has recently articulated “an uneasy case” for judicial review as a 
phase in the legislative process during which courts, like each cham-
ber of Congress and the President before them, can “veto” legisla-
 
 69 The “Council of revision” that James Madison envisioned and that Edmund Randolph 
proposed as part of the Virginia Plan would have had the power to reject laws before their 
coming into operation.  However, under Madison’s proposal, the Council would not have 
been a “legislative” chamber exactly, as it was to be composed of “the Executive and a 
convenient number of the National Judiciary.”  See JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 25 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., Oxford 
University Press 1920). 
 70 For an early suggestion that, in exercising judicial review, the courts function as an addi-
tional legislative chamber, see Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 
Harv. L. Rev. 4, 25 (1936), proposing that reasonableness review under the Constitution 
enables the Court to “represent the sober second thought of the community.” 
 71 See generally Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 
(2006) (arguing against judicial review of legislation). 
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tion.72  For Fallon, the crucial advantage of a third-legislative-chamber 
account of judicial review over other accounts (such as the ones dis-
cussed above) is that it escapes an epistemic criticism offered by Wal-
dron and others:  Even if we assume that there are objectively correct 
answers to questions about constitutional rights,73 the critics charge, 
there is no reason to assume that judges—who frequently disagree 
with each other on just the same issues that divide legislators—are 
more likely to reach the correct answers.  No matter, Fallon replies.  
Because of the “commonly held assumption” “that legislative action is 
more likely to violate fundamental rights than is legislative inaction,”74 
a system that includes judicial review will provide greater protection 
for constitutional rights than a system in which legislators are the fi-
nal arbiters of constitutional meaning.  Thus, Fallon’s defense of 
judicial review does not depend on the assumption that judges are 
better at getting to the truth about constitutional rights claims than 
legislators.75 
Third-legislative-chamber defenses of judicial review have a num-
ber of vices, however.  To begin, judicial review cannot simply be 
added to a system of legislative supremacy.  One of the complaints of 
the judicial review critics, including Waldron, is that judicial review 
discourages elected officials from taking seriously their obligation to 
uphold constitutional rights.  Conscientious legislators in a system 
without judicial review, the argument goes, know that their potential 
vote against a bill is all that stands between it and the persons subject 
to it; by contrast, legislators in a system with judicial review may vote 
for legislation without giving serious consideration to constitutional 
 
 72 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
1693, 1695 (2008) (“[L]egislatures and courts should both be enlisted in protecting fun-
damental rights, and . . . both should have veto powers over legislation that might reason-
ably be thought to violate such rights.”). 
 73 Waldron and Fallon both discuss constitutional rights rather than constitutional law more 
broadly, but for present purposes nothing turns on that fact. 
 74 Fallon, supra note 72, at 1710. 
 75 Fallon nonetheless claims that judges have a distinct “perspective” that will likely make 
them more sensitive to some kinds of rights violations than legislators are likely to be.  See 
id. at 1708–09 (“[A] reason to give courts a veto power is that courts are likely to have a 
perspective that might make them more sensitive than legislatures to some possible rights 
violations . . . .”).  In describing that distinct perspective, Fallon uses language that sug-
gests that it is not merely different but also more likely to get at the truth about rights.  
See, e.g., id. at 1709 (“[J]udges’ professionally ingrained instincts and processes of judg-
ment are likely to differ from those of legislators and to be better adapted to reflecting 
such imperfect wisdom about the content of rights as our legal tradition embodies.”).  
Because the issue is tangential to my purposes here, I shall bracket the question of 
whether Fallon truly treats judges as no better than legislators at understanding the truth 
about rights. 
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objections, on the assumption that the courts will protect any consti-
tutional rights the law violates.76  In principle, the addition of judicial 
review to a legal system could actually weaken protection for constitu-
tional rights.  Absent judicial review, perhaps the legislature would 
have rejected on constitutional grounds some number of laws each 
year.  With the addition of judicial review, however, the legislature 
only rejects some smaller number of laws per year on constitutional 
grounds, relying on the promise of a judicial failsafe.  But that prom-
ise proves false if the courts do not invalidate all of the additional laws 
the legislature has passed—and, guided by principles of judicial re-
straint, it is at least possible that the courts will fail in just that way.77 
These considerations are obviously quite speculative.  It is imposs-
ible to say in the abstract whether the direct effect of judicial review—
judicial invalidation of some number of laws—is larger than its possi-
ble indirect effect—discouraging independent constitutional judg-
ment by legislators.  The answer will undoubtedly depend on histori-
cally path-dependent factors such as political culture.  But the 
possibility that judicial review could actually diminish protection for 
rights cannot simply be dismissed. 
Moreover, even if we assume with Fallon that the addition of judi-
cial review decreases the likelihood that any given legislative proposal 
will become operative, it is not obvious that this is normatively desira-
ble.  At some point, added veto gates make legislation too difficult to 
enact.  Where that point is, of course, depends on how strongly liber-
tarian one’s premises are.  Fallon himself acknowledges as much by 
relying on substantive as well as procedural principles to increase the 
odds 
that a system of judicial review can be so designed that the total moral 
costs of the overenforcement of rights that judicial review would likely 
produce will be lower than the moral costs that would result from the 
underenforcement of rights that would likely occur in the absence of 
judicial review.78   
 
 76 See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 57–60 
(1999) (referring to the phenomenon as “judicial overhang”); cf. Waldron, supra note 71, 
at 1384–85, 1403 (suggesting that the existence of judicial review focuses attention on le-
gal interpretation at the expense of sustained legislative debate and acknowledging the 
possibility that “legislatures . . . operate irresponsibly and in a way that fails to take rights 
seriously because [of] the knowledge that the courts are there as backup”). 
 77 But see Keith E. Whittington, Herbert Wechsler’s Complaint and the Revival of Grand Constitu-
tional Theory, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 509, 538–39 (2000) (asserting that notwithstanding the 
judicial overhang, the net effect of judicial review is beneficial). 
 78 Fallon, supra note 72, at 1713–14. 
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The crucial question is “how to weigh the risks and costs of underen-
forcement against those of overenforcement.”79 
What Fallon shows is the possibility that judicial review might im-
prove a legal system.  If, in some legal system, the risks of underen-
forcement of rights outweigh the risks of overenforcement, then add-
ing judicial review could result in a net improvement.  However, a 
highly counter-majoritarian form of judicial review could result in a 
legal system in which the overenforcement risks outweigh the unde-
renforcement risks.  One has a plausible third-legislative-chamber ac-
count of judicial review only if one is reasonably confident that judi-
cial review will come closer to the right balance of overenforcement 
and underenforcement risks. 
One would still need to say quite a good deal more (as Fallon 
does) in order to justify any particular third-legislative-chamber ac-
count of judicial review.  After all, if one were only interested in mak-
ing legislation more difficult, then it is hardly clear why moving from 
a regime of legislative supremacy to a system that includes judicial re-
view is superior to other barriers to legislative action, such as impos-
ing a supermajority requirement for all legislation.  Nor is the ques-
tion of balancing the risks of over-protection against the risks of 
under-protection a simply quantitative question.  The real issue is not 
how much regulation is optimal but what regulation is optimal.  A 
third-legislative-chamber account thus needs to be supplemented by a 
substantive defense of judicial review.  And the supplemental account 
may end up including an interpretive theory like representation-
reinforcement, originalism, or living constitutionalism.  If so, then 
the third-legislative-chamber account will not be an alternative to 
these other theories but a way of reconceptualizing the work they do. 
That reconceptualization would have value because, to return to 
our main topic, the Friedman thesis does not undercut third-
legislative-chamber theories.  The proper function of judicial review 
in third-legislative-chamber accounts is to nudge the legal system off 
of a rights-under-protective point and onto a somewhat less under-
protective or slightly overprotective point.  That is a modest goal, 
consistent with the relatively modest capacity of courts for counter-
majoritarian decisions.  If we can “encase” whatever interpretive 
theory we deem most attractive in a third-legislative-chamber view of 
judicial review, perhaps we can draw some of the sting of the Fried-
man thesis.  Specifying exactly how to do so is the difficult task that 
 
 79 Id. at 1733. 
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the Friedman thesis sets for constitutional theorists who grapple se-
riously with the track record of judicial review in the United States. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The record of judicial review in the United States shows that 
courts rarely act in a strongly counter-majoritarian way, and that 
when they do, the political system eventually finds ways of bringing 
the courts back in line with the considered opinions of the public.  
Consequently, constitutional law faces a majoritarian difficulty to 
which the leading theories of constitutional interpretation succumb.  
Representation-reinforcement, originalism, and living constitutional-
ism all aim to justify counter-majoritarian judicial interventions 
beyond the demonstrated capacity of the courts.  By contrast, third-
legislative-chamber accounts of judicial review only require courts to 
act in an occasionally counter-majoritarian fashion, and for that rea-
son, do not succumb to the majoritarian difficulty.  Third-legislative-
chamber accounts, however, do not prescribe any particular mode of 
constitutional interpretation; they must be supplemented by other, 
more substantive, theories.  The leading accounts of constitutional 
law—representation-reinforcement, originalism, and living constitu-
tionalism—are obvious candidates for filling in the content of third-
legislative-chamber approaches.  Placing such substantive interpretive 
accounts within the context of a third-legislative-chamber view may 
ease the otherwise-impossible-to-satisfy demands of strong counter-
majoritarianism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
